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Armenia: Privatization and Foreign
Direct Investment in a Climate of Political
and Economic Instability
ANAHID M. UGURLAYAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Armenia, a
member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),1 has
progressively developed into a force in the Transcaucasus region.
As of September 23, 1991, Armenia transformed into a democracy
and has implemented sweeping economic reforms to spur its weak
economy.
2
Plagued by war with Azerbaijan over the disputed region of
Nagorno-Karabakh and ravaged by a devastating earthquake in
1988, Armenia was faced with a crumbling infrastructure, limited
natural resources, and weak agricultural and industrial bases.3 As
the war intensified, Azerbaijan and Turkey imposed an economic
blockade against Armenia, allowing little or no fuel to enter the
country.4 Nevertheless, on September 23, 1991, Armenia declared
its independence and shortly thereafter elected its first
democratically-elected President, Levon Ter-Petrossian.5  He
instituted agricultural and enterprise privatization reforms,
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1. THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1998, at 434 (1998).
2. Id. at 434, 437.
3. See id. at 433-34.
4. See id. at 434.
5. Id.
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introduced a new currency, reformed banking laws, and enacted
foreign investment laws to facilitate foreign direct investment.6 In
addition, Armenia entered into investment treaties with the
United States, France, and the European Union.7 To alleviate the
energy crisis resulting from the Azeri economic blockade,
Armenia constructed a gas pipeline to import gas from Russia and
Turkmenistan.8
Despite this economic reform, Armenia continues to face
many problems, notably political unrest stemming from the Prime
Minister's recent assassination. The assassination greatly
diminished foreign investment into Armenia, thereby exacerbating
Armenia's social welfare problems. In addition, investors remain
wary of investment in Armenia because of its fragile cease-fire
with Azerbaijan and corrupt business practices. During the
coming years, Armenia must remain committed to market-based
reforms, encourage and safeguard foreign investment, and
institute more public sector improvements.
Part II of this Article details the political and economic
factors that preceded the development of privatization and foreign
direct investment in Armenia. Part III focuses on the reforms
Armenia has undertaken to improve its economic stability. These
reforms include privatization, currency and banking legislation,
and investment treaties. This Article concludes by analyzing the
future challenges faced by Armenia's economy.
II. ARMENIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY
A. Political Instability
An analysis of the political and economic factors preceding
privatization and foreign direct investment is necessary in order to
understand the development of these concepts in Armenia.
Following the coup in the former Soviet Union, Armenia joined its
fellow neighbors by declaring independence on September 23,
1991. 9 A month later, Levon Ter-Petrossian became Armenia's
6. Id. at 437.
7. See discussion in!ra Part III.C.
8. See MINISTRY OF ECON. (FOREIGN INV. DEP'T), ARMENIA: FOREIGN
INVESTMENT GUIDE 57 (1996) [hereinafter ARMENIA: FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE].
9. THE EUROPA WORLD YEARBOOK 1998, supra note 1, at 434.
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first democratically-elected President. 10 Ter-Petrossian dominated
Armenia's governmental structure by promulgating and signing
laws, developing foreign and military policy, and signing various
international treaties.
1f
The Armenian Constitution does not provide for an equitable
distribution of power among the various branches of government,
as the President's power has few checks and civic institutions are
weak.' 2 The President appoints the Prime Minister, who, along
with the other Ministers, comprise "the Government," the
executive branch of Armenia. 13  The President may dismiss the
National Assembly and direct many of its activities (including
nominating members of the Constitutional Court), propose
amnesty for criminals, and ratify international treaties.14
While reserving much power for the President, the Armenian
Constitution legitimizes the government by creating a structure for
the judicial system. 15 While the Constitution has given Armenia's
10. Glenn E. Curtis & Ronald G. Suny, Armenia, in ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN, AND
GEORGIA COUNTRY STUDIES 1, 58 (Glenn E. Curtis ed., 1995).
11. Id. at 58-59; THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1998, supra note 1, at 442.
12. Selina Williams, Hopes Slim for Progress on Karabakh, FIN. TIMES (London),
Apr. 16, 1998, LEXIS, News Library, Fintme File. The administrative territorial units are
regions and communities, with local self-government executed at the community level by
community leaders, such as elders or mayors, elected for a three-year term. THE EUROPA
WORLD YEAR BOOK 1998, supra note 1, at 442. The government appoints regional
governors to implement the government's regional policy. Id.
13. THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1998, supra note 1, at 442. The Prime
Minister recommends to the President persons to appoint as the remaining Ministers. Id.
The Prime Minister also directs the activities of the government by protecting the rights of
citizens and by ensuring the implementation of state policies such as education, culture,
health care, and social security. Id. The National Assembly (legislature), however, must
confirm the state budget and approve all programs introduced by the government. Id.
14. See id. The National Assembly is comprised of 131 deputies who are elected to a
four-year term. Id. Before the Constitution was approved on July 5, 1995, the National
Assembly was almost twice as large, with 248 members. See Curtis & Suny, supra note 10,
at 58. The increased size of the National Assembly, however, is not an indicator of more
effective representation. For example, in the early 1990s, the National Assembly failed to
act decisively on major legislative issues because the majority required to enact such laws
was rarely present. Id. Much of its duties involve the implementation of executive
initiatives. See THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1998, supra note 1, at 443.
15. Before the Constitution was enacted, the powers of the legislative and executive
branches had not been delineated. See Curtis & Suny, supra note 10, at 60. Presently, the
Constitution stipulates that the judiciary be separate from the other branches. Id. The
President heads the Council of Justice, and the Minister of Justice and the Procurator
General are also included in the Council. THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1998, supra
note 1, at 442. The Constitutional Court determines the constitutionality of international
treaties and decrees from the National Assembly as well as from the President. Id.
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nascent democracy more legitimacy, it is unclear from recent
elections whether corruption has been eradicated.16 In fact,
during presidential elections in April 1998, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) issued an election
report in which its observers remarked that they had seen "ballot
box stuffing, discrepancies in the vote count ... and instances of
intimidation directed towards voters, election commission
members[,J and candidate proxies."'17 Moreover, although the
Communist Party is practically non-existent, crackdowns on the
opposition Dashnak party and closure of many opposition papers
raise doubts about Armenia's commitment to democracy.
18
Armenia faced its gravest internal political crisis since 1991
when Prime Minister Vazgen Sargissian and National Assemby
Chairman Karen Demirchian were assassinated on October 27,
1999.19 Both officials were leading figures in Armenian politics.
20
The assassinations directly impacted foreign investment, which
dropped 92.2% from 1998 to 1999.21
Armenia's fragile cease-fire agreement with Azerbaijan over
the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh also contributes to
the country's political instability.22  Nagorno-Karabakh is an
autonomous region in Azerbaijan with a large Armenian
population. 23 Spurred by numerous demonstrations and protests,
16. See Williams, supra note 12, at 3.
17. Id. Armenia was admitted to the OSCE in 1992. THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR
BOOK 1998, supra note 1, at 434. Robert Kocharian is the current President of Armenia
and while it is somewhat early to determine his overall effectiveness, it has been argued
that he will hinder peace talks regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, having been its last President
who rejected a draft settlement in 1997. See Williams, supra note 12, at 3.
18. Pyotr Vasilchikov, Armenia: Phenomenon of Stability, RUsSIAN PRESS DIGEST,
Sept. 20, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, SPD File; Chrystia Freeland, Economic Reforms
Prompt Hopes of Renaissance, FIN. TIMES SURVEY, June 7, 1995, at 35. Tension between
the government and the Dashnak party continues to the present, and while twenty-six
principal newspapers and sixteen principal periodicals are in circulation, they are not
regularly available to the entire population. THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1998,
supra note 1, at 444-45.
19. Armenia: Review 2000, EUR. REv. WORLD OF INFO., Sept. 19, 2000, at 1.
20. See id.
21. Emil Danielyan, Armenia's Stagnant Economy, INSTTrUTE FOR WAR & PEACE
REPORTING (CAUCASUS REPORTING SERVICE No. 15), Jan. 21, 2000,
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/cau/cau_200001_15_06_eng.txt; see Armenia:
Review 2000, supra note 19, at 2.
22. See Danielyan, supra note 21.
23. See THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1998, supra note 1, at 433. Nagorno-
Karabakh was given to Azerbaijan in 1921. Id.
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Armenia decided to incorporate Nagorno-Karabakh in 1988.24
Azerbaijanis began to flee from Karabakh and anti-Armenian
backlash ensued, leading to many casualties. 25 In September 1989,
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev tried unsuccessfully to broker
an agreement that would increase Karabakh's autonomy within
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, however, instituted an economic
blockade against Armenia, which escalated the conflict to war.
26
In 1991, a nine-nation group of mediators from the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now
renamed OSCE) negotiated a cease-fire between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. The cease-fire, however, immediately broke down
and led to a stalemate. 27 In May 1994, the parties agreed to a
different cease-fire proposal presented by the CSCE and Russia,
which was formalized in July 1994.28 Since then, the OSCE
"Minsk Group" has drafted a settlement agreement between the
parties, but Armenia has refused to accept its terms.
29
Armenian President Robert Kocharian and Azerbaijian
President Heydar Aliyev engaged in direct talks this year. The
exchange of territories and economy were the main topics
discussed.30 The creation of a "common state" of Azerbaijan and
Nagorno-Karabakh remains on the table (though rejected by
Azerbaijan), and vital economic reforms are still not underway as
Azerbaijan rejects economic cooperation with Armenia while the
territorial conflict remains unsettled.31  Despite the unresolved
24. Id.
25. Id. In one rally, twenty-six Armenians were killed. Id. The problem was
compounded by the refusal of the Presidium of the former Supreme Soviet to allow the
transfer of Karabakh. Id.
26. Curtis & Suny, supra note 10, at 21.
27. Id. at 24; Freeland, supra note 18, at 37.
28. THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1998, supra note 1, at 435-36. The cease-fire
remains intact, despite sporadic violations. Id. at 436.
29. Id. The terms of the settlement responded to Azerbaijan's demands, requiring
three principles to be addressed: the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh, territorial integrity
of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and security guarantees for the residents of Nagorno-
Karabakh. Id. Relations with Azerbaijan have worsened since 1997, but hope for
settlement arose when Ter-Petrossian, Armenia's former President, agreed to the OSCE's
"stage-by-stage" settlement and even stated that Nagorno-Karabakh would never be fully
independent or integrated into Armenia. Id.
30. Armenia: Review 2000, supra note 19, at 1.
31. Id. Recently, Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister, Vilayat Guliyev, reported that the
peace negotiations were in a deadlock. See Armen Zakarian, Azeri FM Says Karabakh
Talks in Deadlock, Criticizes OSCE Mediators, RADIO FREE EuR.RADIO LIBERTY
(ARM. REP.), Nov. 13, 2000, http://www.rferl.org/bd/ar/reports/archives/2000/11/0-
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
territorial dispute, recent amendments to the tax code in
Karabakh aim to develop small and medium-sized businesses as
well as land privatization, all of which are designed to attract more
foreign investment to the region.
32
B. Economic Instability
The roots of Armenia's economic crisis are not entirely
political.33 In 1988, a devastating earthquake ravaged Armenia,
causing millions of dollars of damage to its infrastructure and
destroying approximately one-third of its industry.34  The
earthquake also caused a 32% loss in electrical power.
3
The economic blockade imposed by Azerbaijan further
compounded the damaging effects of the earthquake.3 6 The
blockade affected virtually all sectors of the economy. It
hampered the sale and delivery of goods traveling to Armenia via
Azerbaijan. 37 The energy sector was virtually paralyzed, as Russia
and Turkmenistan halted the delivery of gas into Armenia. Until
1996, electricity was only available for one to two hours a day.
38
The gas supply was halted completely in December 1992, and
Armenia was forced to use electric energy. 39 This shift resulted in
a three-fold increase in the use of electric power, causing
hydropower to be utilized at maximum capacity, thereby creating
a water shortage in Lake Sevan, Armenia's sole long-term source
131100.html. He criticized the OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by France, Russia, and the
United States, for failing to present a new peace proposal and relying on hopes for
successful bilateral talks between the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents. See id
32. Karabakh Working on Attracting Investments, DAILY MEDIA DIG. OF
USAID/ARM. ECON. REFORMS, Jan. 21, 2000 (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Review).
33. ARMENIA: FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 8, at 13.
34. When the Earth Stops Shaking, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 1988, at 45; Freeland, supra
note 18, at 35; ARMENIA: FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 8, at 13.
35. See ARMENIA: FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 8, at 57.
36. THEEUROPAWORLDYEARBOOK 1998, supra note 1, at 433-34.
37. Sergei Bablumyan, Armenia's Situation is Desperate, IZVESTIA, May 4, 1992,
LEXIS, News Library, SPD File.
38. Freeland, supra note 18, at 35. Some gas was available from the Georgian black
market, but at inflated prices. Armenia: The Aftermath, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1992, at
59.
39. See ARMENIA: FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 8, at 58. The transition
to electric energy was not a smooth one because the intermittent power supply caused the
pollution of surface and ground waters. Karine Danielian, Stop Degradation of Region,
NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Feb. 17,1993, LEXIS, News Library, SPD File.
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of drinking water. 40  The crisis worsened during the harsh winter
months between 1992 and 1994, as Armenia experienced extreme
energy shortages.
4 1
Armenia has been searching for alternate energy sources,
shifting to nuclear and hydropower to decrease its reliance on
imported fuels. All the while, Armenia has been working toward
modernizing its existing facilities and guaranteeing a supply of
electricity for the first time since its independence. In
September 1998, ISH-Cerpadla, a Czech pump manufacturer,
contracted with Armenia to supply six special pumps for the
Medzamor nuclear power station, which were being reconstructed
by the U.S. firm, Burns and Roe Enterprises.43 Additionally, in an
effort to combat the gas shortages, Armenia and Iran constructed
an 875-mile-long gas pipeline, which supplied fuel in 1997, and also
concluded accords to obtain liquefied gas.44  As a result, gas
supplies were restored to Armenian households in 1997. 45
40. Danielian, supra note 39; ARMENIA: FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 8,
at 58.
41. See ARMENIA: FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 8, at 58. Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 52% in 1992. See Freeland, supra note 18, at 35.
Armenia has since resumed the use of nuclear power. See THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR
BOOK 1998, supra note 1, at 437. In 1995, it reopened the second generation unit of its
sole nuclear power station, Medzamor, which was shut down following the 1988
earthquake. Id. In 1996, nuclear power increased to 44.6% of energy consumption, which
was an increase from 5.5% in 1995. Id.
42. See Selina Williams, Isolated Armenia Feels the Cold in the Transcaucasus, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1998, at 3; see also ARMENIA: FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 8,
at 58-59. "[O]n March 13, 1998, the Ministry of Finance and Economic [sic] of Armenia
and the Dutch Ministry of Economy signed an inter-governmental memorandum on
mutual understanding, providing for a joint study by Dutch and Armenian experts on the
possibility of wind power usage .... ." First Results of Wind Power Research to Be
Announced in August 2000, DAILY MEDIA DIG. OF USAID/ARM. ECON. REFORMS, Jan.
19, 2000 (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law
Review). The two-stage study will monitor the wind stations delivered to Armenia,
determine the feasibility of the construction of sites for the installation of wind-power
stations, and elaborate upon the development of an investment program. Dutch, Danish
Companies Implementing Alternative Energy Development Program in Armenia, NOYAN
TAPAN NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 3, 2000 (on file with author). The Dutch government also
provided $600,000 in grants to sponsor solar energy research in Armenia. First Results of
Wind Power Research to Be Announced in August 2000, supra.
43. ISH-Cerpadla Completes a Contract for a Power Station in Armenia, ACCESS
CZECH REP. Bus. BULL., Sept. 4, 1998, LEXIS, News Library, Aeebtn File.
44. Armenia, Iran to Start Work on Gas Pipeline, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 13,
1995, LEXIS, News Library, AFP File. Recently, the Armenian Defense Minister, Serge
Sarkissian, and Iranian Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharazi, met to discuss the gas pipeline
with the Armenian Defense Minister and called for an "acceleration" of the project.
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Industrial production declined because the blockade
prevented the importation of raw materials to Armenia.
46
Consequently, many production facilities were shut down. 47  To
revitalize its industry, Armenia shifted the focus of industrial
production from the traditional sectors, such as electrotechnical
equipment and radio electronics, to the production of textiles and
jewelry.48
The economic blockade also affected Armenia's exploitation
of its natural resources. 49  Armenia possesses few natural
resources, importing petroleum and natural gas from Russia and
Turkmenistan, respectively.50  Many of Armenia's natural
resources are in the form of minerals.51 During the blockade,
Armenia Eager to Get Gas Pipeline Construction Underway, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Nov. 8, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, AFP File. The Iranian Foreign Minister declared that
Iran had completed the necessary preparations for the project and that Iran was prepared
to commence the construction of the pipeline. Id. An additional agreement was reached
in 1997 with a Russian company, Gazprom, and an international energy corporation to
improve Armenia's gas infrastructure. THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1998, supra
note 1, at 437.
45. Low Operational Level of Gas Pipelines Accounts for Accidents, NOYAN TAPAN
NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 19, 1998 (on file with author).
46. See I. Komarov, Transcaucasia, RAZvrFIYE, Apr. 30, 1993, LEXIS, News Library,
SPD File.
47. Id. In 1992, Benetton, one of the first large international companies to set up in
Armenia, was forced to shut down its two factories because raw materials could not be
shipped in from Egypt and electricity was scarce. Armenia: The Aftermath, supra note 38,
at 59.
48. See THE EUROPA WORLD YEARBOOK 1998, supra note 1, at 437.
49. See id. at 436.
50. See id. at 437. In 1993, an American expedition tentatively identified some
deposits of natural gas and oil, but exploitation of these resources was expected to take
several years. Curtis & Suny, supra note 10, at 44.
51. See THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1998, supra note 1, at 436; ARMENIA:
FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 8, at 39-42. Copper is the most important raw
material produced, but other materials are also present such as zinc, gold, silver,
semiprecious stones, and building materials, in particular marble and granite. Curtis &
Suny, supra note 10, at 44. With 700 springs, Armenia also has an abundant source of
high-quality mineral water. ARMENIA: FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 8, at
42. In March 2000, the British consultancy company, IMC Mackey & Schnellmann, began
formulating recommendations for expanding the raw material supply of mining enterprises
of the Zangezur ore district. British Firm Plans Mineral Resources Project, SNARK NEWS
AGENCY, Jan. 18, 2000 (on file with author). They also advised the construction of
factories producing copper and molybdenum. Id. Based on these recommendations,
Armenia's Ministry of Industry and Trade drew up an investment program to present at
the London business forum devoted to Armenia, which took place in October 2000. Id.
The project is financed by the European Union's Technical Assistance to the CIS
(TACIS) program, which was set up to aid Russia and the other republics with industrial
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mineral production accounted for 18% of Armenia's total
economic output, ranking fourth among the fifteen former Soviet
republics, and supplying 40% of Soviet molybdenum, copper, zinc,
and other minerals. 52  Periodic shortages of electricity and
petroleum, however, adversely affected mining operations.
Additionally, threats of violence against workers forced them to
flee from their jobs.
53
Amidst this political and economic instability, Armenia
discarded Soviet ideals and moved toward a market economy.
54
The creation of banking and finance laws allows foreign direct
investment and the participation of foreign enterprises in the
privatization process. 5 In addition, the privatization of land and
industry promotes efficiency and allows the population to become
more self-sufficient.
56
III. REFORMS
To understand Armenia's emergence as a market economy, it
is important to understand its Soviet legacy. Armenia and its
Transcaucasian neighbors experienced rapid industrialization and
economic growth following the Stalin era. 7 Soviet rule, however,
did not quell ethnic animosities existing between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. 58 Furthermore, Armenia's integration into the Soviet
centralized economy did not prepare it for the economic crisis
immediately following the 1991 coup.59 The economic effects of
the coup exacerbated Armenia's economic situation as production
declined sharply, inflation rose markedly (3730% annually), and
the fiscal deficit comprised 56% of the Gross Domestic Product
growth and environmental protection. Id.; International Agreements: E.U. Signs Accords
with Three Former Soviet Countries, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 17, at 692 (Apr.
24, 1996).
52. James Dorian, Armenia Aims to Cut Out the Middle Man, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 3,
1991, at 30.
53. Id.
54. See THE EUROPA WORLD YEARBOOK 1998, supra note 1, at 437.
55. See ARMENIA: FOREIGN INVESTmENTGUIDE, supra note 8, at 15, 26-28.
56. Id. at 43-44.
57. Gertrude E. Schroeder, Transcausasia Since Stalin- The Economic Dimension, in
TRANSCAUCASIA, NATIONALISM, AND SociAL CHANGE: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF
ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN, AND GEORGIA 477 (Ronald Grigor Suny ed., 1996).
58. Id.
59. See id.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
(GDP).60 The unemployment rate grew steadily from 3% in 1992
to 10.1% in the first half of 1997.61
As a result of high unemployment, workers retire early,
causing a reduction in pension fund contributions, which are
financed mainly through social security contributions from the
working population. 62 Pensioners accounted for 44.1 % of persons
employed in 1996 compared to 76.9% in Hungary in the same
year. Moreover, Armenian industries are still adversely
impacted by the Soviet system of specialization, which favored the
development of certain industries for trade with other republics
instead of promoting diversification. 64 Consequently, Armenia's
trade was conducted primarily with other republics.
65
Since the coup, Armenia has introduced market-oriented
policies to reduce inflation and lower its budget deficit.66 These
policies aim to encourage banking law reform, which, if successful,
will make Armenia attractive to foreign investors.
While it is widely acknowledged that economic reforms are
more advanced in Armenia than in other republics in the region,
the continued political uncertainty from the ongoing Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict and recent assassinations has led to a decline in
foreign investment in Armenia from $240 million in 1998 to $100
million in 1999.67 Reforms cannot be sustained unless Armenia's
internal political situation is stabilized and foreign investors regain
their willingness to invest.
60. See ARMENIA: FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 8, at 13.
61. INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: MAY 1998, at 109
(1998) [hereinafter IMF 1998].
62. See id. at 109, 114.
63. Id. at 114.
64. Schroeder, supra note 57, at 475.
65. Id.
66. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: MAY 1993, at 61
(1993) [hereinafter IMF 1993]. The IMF publishes this series bi-annually and discusses the
IMF's country projection through an evaluation of market activity and exchange rates.
The projection for Armenia applies to all of the former Soviet republics. Id. at 58. Also,
the IMF classifies Armenia and all former Soviet republics as "countries in transition," not
as "developing countries." Id.
67. Danielyan, supra note 21; see also Armenia: Review 2000, supra note 19, at 3.
The political unrest and financial crisis in Russia contributed to slow economic growth as
GDPin 1999 rose 3.3%, as against the projected 5%, while the 2% inflation rate remained
constant, which is considered too low to strengthen the economy and increase exports.
Armenia: Review 2000, supra note 19, at 2.
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A. Privatization
In 1992, after the election of Armenia's first democratic
government, Armenia passed laws allowing private property
ownership and market reform.68 The Law on State Register of
Enterprises, enacted in September 1993, requires businesses to be
registered with the applicable local division of the State Register
where the business is to be established.6 9 In addition, joint
ventures and wholly-owned foreign enterprises must file
additional documents to verify their financial stability and legal
status, such as the founding contract and bank statements. 70  In
order to register an affiliate or subsidiary, the charter or by-laws
showing affiliations to the parent company and a letter of intent
are required.7 1
Two principal laws governing privatization, enacted in 1996
and 1997, have replaced earlier laws.72 The first is the Law of the
Republic of Armenia on Joint Stock Companies, adopted by the
National Assembly in 1996, which defines the establishment and
registration of privatized companies.73  Joint stock companies
share many of the characteristics found in corporate forms in most
industrialized countries providing the basis for establishing private
business ownership.74 Companies may decide on the amount of
shares to issue (common and/or preferred), the value of each
68. See ARMENIA: FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 8, at 26. The precursor
to this legislation is the Law on Ownership, enacted in October 1990, and it sets forth
various types of ownership afforded Armenian citizens, such as ownership of land,
intellectual property, and securities. Id.
69. Id. at 27-28. Pursuant to my discussion with Mr. Tigran Aloyan, Senior Legal
Advisor at the Ministry of State Property Management, I was informed that a law was
enacted in May 2001, which will replace this law, the title and provisions of which are as
yet unavailable.
70. Id. at 28.
71. Id.
72. The laws governing privatization are frequently amended, requiring verification
with the Ministry of State Property Management of the Republic of Armenia, the
government agency established in July 1999 that, among other things, oversees
privatization. For the most current information available, visit
http://www.privatization.am.
73. See Law of the Republic of Armenia on Joint Stock Companies (Apr. 30, 1996)
art. 2, http://www.privatization.am/lb/lbib.html.
74. A joint stock company is defined as "a legal entity, whose Charter Capital is
divided into a certain number of shares verifying the liabilities of the shareholders towards
the Company." Id. art. 3(1). Charter capital refers to a company's working capital. Id.
art. 33(1). It is the equivalent of a corporation as both share many features: they may own
property; create subsidiaries; sue and be sued; and open bank accounts. Id. art. 1(2)(4)(5).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
share, and the rights pertaining to each type of share that are
stated on the share certificate.75  Share ownership is made
available to employees of the company, who, collectively, may
own up to 25% of the working capital of the company. 76 The joint
stock companies may be open or closed in nature and are required
to limit a shareholder's liability to the nominal value of his or her
investment.77 The law also governs the merger, restructuring, and
liquidation of companies, all of which require approval at the
shareholders' general meeting.
78
The second law, the Law of the Republic of Armenia on
Privatization of State Property, enacted in 1997, establishes the
rules for the transfer of government-owned enterprises, including
unfinished construction sites to private owners.79 The government
decides the type of privatization (auction, tender, or direct sale)
and considers several criteria, including the financial condition of a
company and the amount of investment needed, to determine
whether or not to privatize a company.80 The government drafts a
program of privatization, which details what properties will be
privatized and the process for purchasing the properties and
submits it for consideration to the Supreme Council, which must
adopt the program prior to implementation. 81  Foreign
corporations are allowed equal access to participate in the
75. Id. arts. 34(2)(5), 35(1). The total amount of preferred shares issued may not
exceed 25% of the working capital of the company. Id. art. 34(2).
76. Id. art. 43(1).
77. Id. arts. 43, 8. Open companies are publicly-held companies that sell shares
through a public offering and allow shareholders to sell their shares, whereas a closed, or
closely-held, company may not have more than twenty-five shareholders who may sell
shares only to board members and predetermined persons who have priority in acquiring
the sold shares. Id. art. 8(2)(3). In accordance with the law on state property privatization
program for 1998-2000, the Armenian government decided to instruct ministries and other
state bodies to take relevant steps to transform closed-type joint stock companies in which
state-owned shares comprise 50% of the authorized capital into open-type joint stock
companies. See Armenian Government Redistributes State-Owned Shares in Joint-Stock
Companies, SNARK NEws AGENCY, Jan. 14, 2000, at 1.
78. Law of the Republic of Armenia on Joint Stock Companies arts. 18-32.
79. See Law of the Republic of Armenia on Privatization of State Property (Dec. 17,
1997) art. 1, http://www.privatization.am/lb/lb2a.html.
80. Id. art. 14(2).
81. Id. art. 4. The Supreme Council is the precursor to the National Assembly, the
Parliament of Armenia. In order for citizens to purchase the privatized property, they
must obtain a privatization certificate, which is not a receipt but rather securities that may
be used as a method of payment for property or stock, and the conditions of the issuance of
these certificates are determined by the privatization program. Id. arts. 6-7.
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privatization process, and may bid on enterprises through a tender
offer, although the government may decide whether it wants to
retain full or partial control of a certain enterprise.82 Employees
of enterprises and "small" site privatization 83 are provided equal
access to purchase privatized property, with preferential treatment
afforded to said employees in the case of direct sales of privatized
property.84 These laws collectively demonstrate the loosening of
governmental controls over the economy to allow private
ownership of property and encourage foreign investment.
Armenia was the first of the former Soviet republics to
eliminate collective ownership of land, allowing land purchases as
of January 1, 1993.85 The government sold the land instead of
freely relinquishing it in hopes of urging citizens to become
farmers, thereby maximizing the use of the land. 6 Even before
Armenia declared independence, however, it commenced
privatization by dissolving all state-owned agrarian enterprises
(sovkhoves) and all Soviet-type collective farms (kolkhoves) into
320,000 family farms.87 This privatization allowed the agricultural
production of the GDP to grow above 40% from 1993 to 1997
compared to 18% in 1990.8' This production prevented famine
82. Id. arts. 5(2), 17.
83. "Small" sites are defined as "legal persons or their separated divisions specialized
in the spheres of public catering, consumer services and commerce," the latter of which
does not exceed 200m 2 at the time of evaluation. Id. art. 10(2).
84. Id. art. 10(1)(3). In addition, no more than 20% of state stock is set aside for
employees provided that more than 50% of the employees agree to purchase the stock. Id.
art. 10(2).
85. Sergei Bablumyan, Armenia Lifts Land Purchase and Sale Ban, IZVESTIA, Aug.
14, 1993, LEXIS, News Library, SPD File. "Foreigners are not allowed to buy land in
Armenia, but they can buy real estate." Haroutioun Khachatrian, Privatization in
Armenia, OXFORD ANALYTICA BRIEFS, Apr. 23, 1998 (on file with author) [hereinafter
Privatization in Armenia].
86. Bablumyan, supra note 85.
87. Haroutioun Khachatrian, Armenia: Agricultural Investment, OXFORD
ANALYTICA BRIEFS, July 13, 1998 (on file with author) [hereinafter Agricultural
Investment in Armenia]. The distribution of land, livestock, and machines was based on
the size of the family. Id. In addition, 20% of the dismantled land remained under
governmental control for further distribution. ARMENIA FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE,
supra note 8, at 43.
88. See Agricultural Investment in Armenia, supra note 87, at 1. The only decrease in
agricultural production occurred in 1993 because foodstuffs, imported from Russia, could
not be transported into Armenia due to the ethnic conflict in Abkhazia. Id.; see also IM
1993, supra note 66, at 59 (discussing Bulgaria's and Romania's dependence on primary
goods imported from the former Soviet Union, and how that affected their reform efforts).
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during the height of the war and blockade (1992-1994).89 The
land market, however, has developed slower because few families
have the resources to invest in future development and export
products, or to obtain credit.
90
International organizations and other nations are
coordinating programs with the Armenian government to
strengthen Armenia's agricultural sector and promote self-
sufficiency. 91 The $14.5 million Supporting Agricultural Reforms
Program, sponsored by the World Bank, envisions establishing a
network of consulting services throughout the country as well as
providing loans to small enterprises engaged in agricultural
commerce. 92  The World Bank recently developed a $20 million
program to enhance the profitability, reliability, and sustainability
of irrigation systems.93  Further, the Agricultural Wholesale
Market project, initiated in 1996 by the EBRD with $14.5 million
in funding, envisions the restructuring of the fresh food market.
94
In an effort to strengthen the private seed industry, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan
donated 3,000 metric tons of wheat for auction to farmers.95  In
89. See Agricultural Investment in Armenia, supra note 87.
90. Id. Armenia is a member of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation, and is seeking membership to the World Trade Organization
(WTO). THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1998, supra note 1, at 437.
91. See British Firm Plans Mineral Resources Project, SNARK NEws AGENCY, Jan.
18, 2000 (on file with author).
92. Agricultural Investment in Armenia, supra note 87, at 1-2. The program was
launched in 1998 and completion is expected by 2002. Agricultural Programs Worth 88.4
Million USD Implemented in Armenia, NOYAN TAPAN NEws AGENCY, Jan. 13, 2000 (on
fie with the author).
93. Posting of Mihran Toumajan, mihran-toumaj@hotmail.com, World Bank Projects
Update on Armenia, to Armenian News Network (Apr. 14, 2000) (copy on file with
author). Currently, an irrigation system restoration project worth $55.15 million is
underway in Armenia. Agricultural Programs Worth 88.4 Million USD Implemented in
Armenia, supra note 92. It is funded by USAID and the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD). Id. EFAD also loaned $12.95 million to develop
agricultural services in Armenia's northwest regions. Id.
94. See Agricultural Investment in Armenia, supra note 87, at 2. In 1997, the
government suspended the loan, arguing that it was not interest-free, like the World Bank
loans, and is now seeking private investors to complete the program. Id. The government
has since reduced the project to a much smaller scale. EBRD Had Approved Six
Investments in Armenia Totally [sic] EUR 145.30 [Million], NOYAN TAPAN NEWS
AGENCY, Apr. 10, 2000 (on file with author).
95. USDA Will Donate Wheat to Armenian Group, 15 INT'LTRADE REP. (BNA) No.
12, at 542 (Mar. 25, 1998). On October 27, 1998, the USDA announced a preliminary
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1995, the European Union's Technical Assistance to the CIS
(TACIS) program and Credit Agricole of France established the
Agricultural Cooperation Bank of Armenia, which provides
secured short-term loans of up to $1500 to farmers.
96
These reforms have allowed for the development of joint
ventures and acquisitions in the agricultural sector.97  For
example, the French firm Pernod Ricard acquired the Yerevan
Cognac Distillery for $55 million from the Armenian
government. 98 Pernod Ricard invested $17 million between 1997
and 2000.99 In addition, Grand Tobacco, an Armenian-Canadian
joint venture, has invested $415,000 to develop new tobacco
fermentation technologies and expand the use of Armenian-
produced tobacco in the production of cigarettes.1 °° As of 2001,
Canada has invested approximately $4.1 million in the joint
venture.10 1 The joint venture has facilitated the completion of
deals with three hundred farms.
10 2
Industrial privatization, particularly in the mining sector, has
been slower than expected. The 1998-2000 privatization program,
allocation of funds to Armenia, which is one of fourteen countries receiving aid totaling
$166 million under the Title I concessional sales program designed to promote U.S.
agricultural commodities as well as develop long-term, broad-based sustainable
agricultural development. USDA Announces Pub. L. No. 480 Allocations, 15 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 1844 (Nov. 4, 1998). The USDA also allocates funds to
Armenia through its "Food for Progress" program, which supports countries that have
made commitments to introduce or expand free market elements in agriculture. Id. In
April 1998, Armenia received 1,500 metric tons of dry whole milk that is slated to be sold
to dairy producers, and the proceeds of the sales will support community health programs
and ensure free distribution of dairy products to the needy. USDA to Donate Milk for
Armenian Programs, 15 INT'LTRADE REP. (BNA) No. 13, at 585 (Apr. 1, 1998).
96. Agricultural Investment in Armenia, supra note 87, at 2.
97. See id.
98. Paul J. Deveney, French Firm Buys Armenian Distillery, WALL ST. J., June 9,
1998, at A12.
99. "Pernod Ricard" Investing $17 Million in Cognac Winery, IPR STRATEGIC Bus.
INFo. DATABASE, May 7, 2000 (on file with author). The Russian financial crisis
contributed to low investment projections because Russia is one of the largest importers of
Armenian cognac, but sales have since increased. See id. Pemod claims that it suffered
$15 million in damages due to the government's investment in the Ararat label. Id.
100. See Grand Tobacco Plans to Invest $1 Million in Armenia's Tobacco-Growing,
NoYAN TAPAN NEws AGENcY, Oct. 19, 1998 (on file with author).
101. Id.
102. Id. In September 2000, Mr. Hrant Vardanian, head of the Armenian-Canadian
Grand Candy joint venture, and Mr. Anushavan Danielian, Prime Minister of Karabakh,
commenced discussions for setting up a tobacco fermentation factory. Armenian-
Canadian Joint Venture to Create New-Jobs in Karabagh, ARMENPRESS, Sept. 6, 2000 (on
file with author).
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however, provides debt and tax relief for large enterprises that
hope to privatize. 10 3  Through the privatization process, joint
ventures in various industrial sectors have taken place, indicating
confidence in the level of investment protections. In 1997,
Kovohute Bridlicna (KB), the largest Czech aluminum processor
of food, tobacco and pharmaceutical packaging, agreed to set up a
joint venture with Kanas, a Yerevan-based aluminum company.
10 4
Kanas agreed to provide the needed technology; KB agreed to
provide financing, investment expertise, and its consumer base.
10 5
KB regards Armenia as essential in obtaining a dominant position
in the central and eastern European packaging markets.
10 6
The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
agreed to provide $160 million in loan guarantees for a new
private equity fund to invest in industrial properties located in
twenty-three countries, including Armenia. 107 The fund seeks to
spur regional economic growth by providing business
infrastructure, such as warehouses, distribution centers, regional
headquarters, and sales offices, for U.S. companies. 10 8  The
continued success of industrial privatization is uncertain given the
meager $8 million invested by foreign investors in the industrial
sector in 2000.109 This trend is consistent with the drastic decrease
in foreign investment since 1999.110 Investments in certain
103. See Privatization in Armenia, supra note 85.
104. Kovohute Bridlicna, Aluminum Processor, Will Set Up a Joint Venture in
Armenia, MLADA FRONTADNES, Mar. 25, 1997, at 15 (on file with author).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. International Finance: OPIC Backs New $240 Million Fund to Invest in Ex-Soviet
Properties, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 28, at 1146 (July 10, 1996). Among the
participants in the fund are MCI Communications and Bank of Boston. Id. The industrial
properties include industrial parks, warehouses, light manufacturing sites, and retail
outlets. Id. OPIC has also announced plans to provide $300 million in financing over the
next two to three years to American companies doing business in Armenia. Government
Attempts Further Measures to Improve Economic Situation, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO
LIBERTY (ARM. REP.), Nov. 13, 2000,
http://www.rferl.orglbdlar/reports/archives/2000/11/0-131100.html. "The first OPIC-
financed project now underway involves an $18 million credit to AK Development, a
company owned by Diaspora Armenians that is investing in the Armenia Hotel." Id.
108. International Finance: OPIC Backs New $240 Million Fund to Invest in Ex-Soviet
Properties, supra note 107, at 1146.
109. See Trade and Industry Minister Optimistic About Inflow of New Foreign
Investments, ARMENPRESS, Sept. 12, 2000 (on file with the author); see also Armenia:
Review 2000, supra note 19, at 2.
110. See id.
[Vol. 23:427
2001] Armenia: Privatization and Foreign Investment 443
industrial sectors in 2000, however, may prove to be the catalyst
for privatizations in the years to come."'
In May 2000, the largest privatization occurred in the
international tender of four electricity distribution networks.
112
This offering, valued at over $100 million, has accounted for the
increase in investor activity. 113 Following this tender offer, the
government passed a bill that officially adopted the privatization
plan.114  In response to past scandals linked with the sell-off of
other major government owned assets, the World Bank has urged
Armenian authorities to ensure fairness and transparency
throughout the bidding process and to refrain from colluding with
Russian firms on the tender results.115  These concerns must be
fully addressed because the World Bank's allocation of credit for
Armenian budget deficit reduction is closely linked to the
privatization of the electricity networks." 6
111. At the beginning of 2000, Nairit, formerly the largest producer of rubber in the
former Soviet Union, resumed production after several years of inactivity due to
insolvency. See id. at 5. Kanaz, one of Armenia's leading foil producers, will also resume
production. Id. In addition, since 1999, the Armenian government has discussed plans to
start a thermal power plant project with the Mitsubishi and Marubeni corporations, with an
agreement likely to be reached with one of them. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. While the volume of foreign investment is expected to increase, it is unlikely
to increase to the level necessary to achieve an economic breakthrough. Id. at 3.
114. Armenia Passes Law on Privatization in Energy Transmission, INTERFAX
RussLAN NEWS, Aug. 8, 2000 (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review). The networks will be privatized in two packages and the two
major conditions set forth by the Armenian government are that the electricity tariffs
should not be subject to changes until 2002 and that the annual income of the potential
buyers must be no less than $150 million. Four Electricity Distributing Networks To Be
Privatized in Two Packages, NoYAN TAPAN NEws AGENCY, Feb. 4, 2000 (on file with
author). To date, four companies have made tenders: AES of the United States, the Swiss-
Swedish ABB, Electricit6 de France, and the Spanish Union Fenosa. See Privatizing in
Armenia, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 1, 2000, at 1. The shares will be distributed as follows:
51% to strategic investors, 20% to the EBRD, 20% to the state, 5% to other investors,
and 4% to the employees of the companies. Id.
115. WB Urges Fair Bidding in Armenian Energy Privatization, DAILY MEDIA
DIGEST OF USAID/ARM. ECON. REFORMS, Feb. 11, 2000 (on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review). Concerns regarding government
collusion with Russian firms stem from reports that Russia's Gazprom monopoly, backed
by the Russian government, "is lobbying hard to get preferential treatment for its
subsidiary, the rTERA corporation," which plans to bid. Id. Armenia relies heavily on
Russian gas for power generation and Armenia's entire gas infrastructure is dominated by
a Gazprom-controlled joint venture. Id. The World Bank has strongly argued against
granting ownership to Russian entities because of their financial inadequacy. Id.
116. Armenia: Review 2000, supra note 19, at 3. The World Bank, Armenia's largest
lender since independence, closely supervises energy privatization and the last tranche of
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
In its attempt to privatize 2,500 small and medium
enterprises, the Armenian Government faced serious
challenges. 117  Due to the lack of appropriate economic
information concerning the market value of firms, the government
failed to find buyers. 118  Because charges of bribery and
mismanagement serve to thwart foreign investment, investor
confidence in Armenia will increase only if measures are
undertaken to ensure open and accurate management of foreign
investments.
B. New Currency and Banking Reform
In November 1993, Armenia introduced a new currency, the
dram, thereby removing itself from the unstable monetary policies
inherent in the ruble system. n 9 The transition was rocky-citizens
were permitted to exchange a maximum of 50,000 rubles for the
new currency. 120 The dram, nevertheless, has become a strong
currency as evidenced by the appreciation of the nominal
exchange rate since May 1994.121 The stabilization of the dram
has also lowered inflation, from 150% at the end of 1993 to 5% in
2000.122
The present banking system was created shortly after the
introduction of the dram.j23 Armenia's most developed sector is
its structural adjustment credit ((SAC)-3 credit), worth $15 million, was scheduled to be
allocated immediately after the result of the tender for the privatization of the energy
networks; another $30 million, the first tranche of its SAC-4 credit, was disbursed in
October 2000. Id.
117. Privatization of Big Enterprises Opposed, Says State Property Minister,
ARMENPRESS, Nov. 17, 2000 (on file with author). The proposed privatization program
for 2001-2003 is divided into several parts and includes enterprises that were not involved
in previous programs as well as enterprises, mainly building companies and hotels, whose
privatization is opposed by ministries that favor their retention under state control. Id.
The private sector accounts for more than seventy-five percent of Armenia's GDP and
official figures show that seventy-six percent (1533 total) of large and medium-sized
enterprises and eighty-three percent (6829 total) of small ones have been privatized over
the decade. Id.
11". Id.
119. Yuri Kalashnov, Armenia Introduces National Currency, KOMMERSANT, Nov. 22,
1993, at 5 (on file with author).
120. Id.
121. See Freeland, supra note 18, at 35. The stable exchange rate is largely due to the
Armenian Central Bank acting as a monetary regulator. See Danielyan, supra note 21.
122. ARMENIA: FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 8, at 18; see also Armenia:
Review 2000, supra note 19, at 4.
123. Haroutioun Khachatrian, Banking in Armenia, OXFORD ANALYTICA BRIEFS,
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banking, which has thirty-one commercial banks.124  Despite the
high number of commercial banks, the amount of banks was
reduced twofold from 1995 to 1998.125 This resulted in the
tightening of capital adequacy, solvency requirements, and greater
transparency of the banking system.126 Indeed, in 1997, the
banking sector ended with a 55% growth in cumulative assets;
only seven banks reported a net loss.1
27
In 1996, the Central Bank introduced strict regulations of bad
debts, including a liquidation process. 128 At the time, bad debts
amounted to more than half of the assets and loans owned by
banks; now, that figure is near zero.
129
There are no limits on the amount of foreign capital
investment. 130 Only three foreign bank affiliates (out of the thirty-
one commercial banks), however, operate in Armenia: HSBC
Armenia Bank (British), Mellat Bank (Iranian), and Areximbank
(Russian). 131 HSBC has made a considerable contribution toward
the creation of a stable banking system in Armenia, with $9
million in total capital investment, plans to expand the distribution
of automated teller machines, and involvement with the Armenian
Card Company, which issues and services credit cards. 132 One of
Armenia's largest commercial banks, Converse Bank, negotiated
with the EBRD to allocate $1-$1.5 million in credit in March
May 1998 [hereinafter Banking in Armenia] (on file with author).
124. Armenia: Review 2000, supra note 19, at 4.
125. Banking in Armenia, supra note 123. In order to strengthen accountability and
controls in the banking system, detailed internal and external audits have been performed
since 1996 under the control guidance of international bank examiners. See id. There is
cause for concern among analysts who argue that there is no banking sector in Armenia
given that the total capital of the thirty-one commercial banks is a mere $60 million. See
Armenia: Review 2000, supra note 19, at 4.
126. Banking in Armenia, supra note 123.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.; see also Armenia: Review 2000, supra note 19, at 4. Two laws passed by the
Parliament in April 1993, the Law on the Central Bank (CBA) and the Law on Banks and
Banking Activity, authorize the establishment of "foreign-owned, joint venture banks and
branches of foreign banks to be established in Armenia." ARMENIA: FOREIGN
INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 8, at 15. Further, the World Bank granted Armenia a
$16.75 million loan to strengthen the banking sector's lending capacity, "especially for
export-related projects, and [to] help increase the creditworthiness of firms." Armenian
Banking Sector Loan, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 2, at 67 (Jan. 8, 1997).
132. Armenia: Review 2000, supra note 19, at 4.
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through April 2000.133 Converse Bank will thus be one of the first
participants in the EBRD program to support small and medium-
sized businesses.
134
Foreign investment in banks has liberalized foreign currency
transactions. 135  In an effort to attract more foreign currency
deposits, an agreement exists between certain foreign commercial
banks and the Yerevan Stock Exchange to conduct foreign
exchange auctions.136  Moreover, international accounting
standards are scheduled for implementation in 2000 through 2001,
further modernizing the economy and increasing investor
confidence.
137
Despite these reforms and Armenia's creation of the first
securities market in the region, the lack of relevant legislation to
ensure reliable and efficient management of investments will likely
result in Armenia losing the leading role in the regional capital
market.138  This is especially true given the Parliament's recent
rejection of a draft law on Securities Market Regulation. 139 Some
goals of the bill were: to ensure protection of investor rights,
including prevention of fraud; that issuers of securities and other
market participants fully disclose information; and to create
transparent market processes. 140  Further, the fairly stable
133. Id. Another significant commercial bank linked with the EBRD is the
International Commercial Black Sea Bank, a joint venture of the International Bank of
Greece and EBRD. See Banking in Armenia, supra note 123. In an effort to promote
intra-regional trade, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a World Bank affiliate,
and Austria's Raiffeisen Zentralbank (RZB) established a $60 million guarantee facility,
available to all former Soviet republics, including Armenia. International Finance: IFC,
Austrian Bank to Create Facility to Promote Trade in Former Soviet Bloc, 13 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 21, at 848 (May 22, 1996). The objective of creating the
guarantee facility is to increase trade by "expand[ing] the capacity of local banks to offer
proper credit and settlement devices for trade transactions .... " Id. at 849.
134. Armenia: Review 2000, supra note 19, at 4.
135. ARMENIA: FOREIGN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 8, at 18.
136. Id.
137. International Accounting Standards to be Implemented in Armenia in 2000-2001,
DAILY MEDIA DIGEST OF USAID/ARM. ECON. REFORMS, Jan. 21, 2000 (on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review). Levon
Barkhudaryan, Minister of Finance of Armenia, reported that twenty-six of the thirty-five
accounting standards have already been confirmed. Id.
138. Absence of Capital Market Hampers Economic Progress, SMMA States, NOYAN
TAPAN NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 29, 2000 (on file with author).
139. See id.
140. Draft Law on Securities Market Not Approved, DAILY MEDIA DIGEST OF
USAID/ARM. ECON. REFORMS, Feb. 24, 2000 (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Review). The draft bill also provided for the
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currency and single-digit inflation has spurred interest rate
hikes.141  Consequently, the Central Bank's benchmark re-
financing rate is above 40%, which impedes business growth. 14 2 A
strong securities market and low interest rates will boost foreign
investor confidence, raise the capitalization of the existing
commercial banks, and promote the establishment of foreign
affiliate banks in Armenia.
Another important element that attracts more foreign direct
investment is the effectuation of foreign investment treaties. 143
Armenia's investment treaties with the United States, France, and
the European Union have established the groundwork for future
direct investment and joint ventures.
C. Investment Treaties
After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the United
States negotiated the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with
Armenia. 44  Relatively little information is available about the
BIT because it has been in effect for less than four years. 145  It is
important, however, to examine how the treaty impacts foreign
investment.146  Given its implementation of market reforms, the
BIT aims to promote and facilitate private investment in
Armenia.147 A fundamental element of the BIT is its guarantee of
appointment of an independent securities market regulator. Id.
141. Danielyan, supra note 21.
142. Id.
143. See discussion infra Part m.C.
144. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Armenia
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Sept. 23, 1992,
U.S.-Arm., S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-11 [hereinafter Armenia BIT]. The Treaty was
signed on Sept. 23, 1992. Id. It remains in effect for ten years. Id. art. XIII.
145. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second
Wave, 14 MicHi J. INT'L L. 621, 632-33 (1993) [hereinafter Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral
Investment Treaties] (stating that in 1993, no BIT had been in force for more than four
years). The Armenia BIT has only been in force since March 29, 1996, and has remained
in effect throughout the recent political crises that have plagued Armenia. Extensive
research by the author uncovered no evidence to either confirm or deny the success of the
Treaty. Therefore one can reasonably conclude that it is a success because it has remained
in effect for over five years, despite the recent political crises and continued economic
stagnancy.
146. See id. at 633-42.
147. See id. at 634; see also Armenia BIT, supra note 144, art. III. Armenia also
entered into a bilateral investment treaty with France, L'Accord entre le Gouvernement
de ]a Rdpublique frangaise et le Gouvernement de ]a R6publique d'Arm6nie sur
1'encouragement et ]a protection r6ciproques des investissements [Treaty on the
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national and most favored nation (MFN) treatment. 148 Both U.S.
and Armenian investors are afforded the same access and legal
right to acquire and establish investments in Armenia and the
United States, respectively.149  This equal treatment aims to
minimize risk and maximize returns. 150 Upon adoption, the BIT
also locked-in pro-market policies that prevent the state from
retreating to anti-market policies in times of economic
adversity.' 51 For Armenia, the BIT represents a status symbol, a
reward for the market reforms already adopted, and a means to
procure more investment from the United States and other
investors.
152
Several measures of the Armenia BIT protect U.S.
investments: (1) a requirement that compensation be paid in the
event of expropriation of covered investment; 153 (2) a prohibition
on currency exchange controls;154 (3) a requirement that the state
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments], which mirrors its bilateral
investment treaty with the United States with the exception that there are no sector-
related exceptions to the MFN treatment. Law No. 97-779 of Nov. 4, 1995, J.O., Aug. 6,
1997, p. 11696; 1997 Recueil des trait6s, No. 97-779.
148. Armenia BIT, supra note 144, art. 11(9).
149. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 145, at 634; see also
Armenia BIT, supra note 144, art. II(1). It is important to note that BITs effectuated in
the late 1980s, as well as the Armenia BIT in 1992, have included sector-related
exceptions to the general MFN obligation in the annexes of the treaties, which seems
diametrically opposed to promoting investment. See Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral
Investment Treaties, supra note 145, at 641-42. Each side includes exceptions to national
treatment, with the U.S. listing, inter alia, custom house brokers, banking, insurance, and
government grants, while Armenia included, inter alia, government grants, government
insurance and loan programs, customs house brokers, and extraction of natural resources.
Armenia BIT, supra note 144, annex (1), (3). Additionally, the guarantees of MFN
treatment "do not aid the investor in establishing the investment, but do prohibit
discrimination once the host state has allowed the investment to be established." Kenneth
J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic Development The Role of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 512 (1998) [hereinafter
Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization].
150. See Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 145, at 634.
151. See id. at 638.
152. See id. at 634. Kenneth Vandevelde warns that it is difficult to establish a positive
correlation between the implementation of the BIT and increased foreign investment and
that it is important to look to other factors, such as highly skilled workers (especially
present in Armenia) and tax incentives, to assess the growth of foreign investment. See
Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization, supra note 149, at 524-25; U.N. CTR. ON
TRANSNAT'L CORPS., THE DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECr INVESTMENT-A
SURVEY OF THE EVIDENCE at 9, 60, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/121, U.N. Sales No. E.92.II.A.2
(1992).
153. See Armenia BIT, supra note 144, art. III.
154. Id. art. IV(2).
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afford covered investment both national and MFN treatment,
even in the event of war;155 (4) a general obligation of due care
towards covered investment (specifically "fair and equitable"
treatment in accordance with international law); 156 and (5) a
requirement that the host state honor any previous investment
commitments.
157
Compensation for expropriation must be "prompt, adequate
and effective" and equivalent to the "fair market value of the
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriatory
action was taken or became known, whichever is earlier."' 58 As a
result, the compensation amount prevents loss to the investor
because of a change in the exchange rate: "[tihe investor receives
the amount of freely useable currency that [he or she] would have
received had transfer occurred on the date of expropriation, even
though the transfer will be carried out at the rate of exchange on
the date of transfer." 159  In case of dispute, resolution occurs
through arbitration or a procedure agreed to by the United States
and Armenia.160  Further, the investor chooses the mode of
binding arbitration, which is conducted either through the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) or the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
161
Despite the BIT's lack of tangible success, it has encouraged
the implementation of market reforms in Armenia by emphasizing
various levels of investment protection, including
nondiscrimination, security, and dispute resolution. 16 2  The BIT
also provides Armenia with the tools to implement more far-
reaching market-based reforms.
163
155. Id. art. 111(3). The author notes that most BITs grant a right of U.S. investment,
but the right is always limited by local law. See Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization,
supra note 149, at 511. Armenia, as discussed earlier, has implemented many laws,
notably banking and privatization laws, that have permitted increased foreign investment.
See supra Part III.A-B.
156. See Armenia BIT, supra note 144, art. II(2)(a). The treatment article prohibits
performance requirements such as conditioning investment on the export of goods
produced or the local purchase of goods or services. Id. art. 11(5).
157. See Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization, supra note 149, at 504-05.
158. Armenia BIT, supra note 144, art. 111(1).
159. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 145, at 654.
160. Armenia BIT, supra note 144, art. VI(2).
161. Id. art. Vl(3)(i), (iii).
162. Id. arts. III, VI, X.
163. See Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization, supra note 149, at 514. The author
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Multilateral agreements, however, are more effective than the
BIT in promoting a sustainable liberal investment regime in
Armenia.164  Multilateral agreements reflect international
consensus. They embody political legitimacy because the host-
state agrees to conform to a universal legal framework of liberal
investment.165  One such example is Armenia's partnership and
cooperation agreement with the European Union (Treaty). 66
The E.U. Treaty aims to promote trade and investment in
Armenia by encouraging market-based reforms and fostering
cooperation in the areas of investment, mining, education, and
training.167  The Treaty also provides the European Union with
external energy sources. 168 The Treaty helps Armenia harmonize
stresses that BITs are primarily instruments of investment protection, and while this
argument is sound considering Armenia's economic and political problems, it is also
arguable that the Armenia BIT has laid the foundation for increased investment in the
future, especially considering that five years have elapsed from the signing of the Treaty
and its implementation, investment has grown, though unevenly, and the Treaty remains in
effect. This indicates a conscious effort on the part of the United States to monitor the
progress of political and economic reform before allowing the Treaty to go into effect and
in fact, much of the reform took place years before the implementation of the treaty.
Thus, the author's insistence on the limited value of BITs in the case of Armenia is not
applicable.
164. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International
Investment Regime, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 373, 396 (1998) [hereinafter Vandevelde,
Sustainable Liberalism].
165. See id.
166. The treaty was signed on April 22, 1996, and stays in effect for ten years.
International Agreements: European Parliament Endorses Accords with Georgia,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 12, at 534 (March 19,
1997); International Agreements: EU Signs Accords with Three Former Soviet Countries,
supra note 51, at 692. Armenia also entered into a partnership and cooperation treaty with
France, seeking to establish regular meetings among the foreign affairs ministers of each
country to discuss topics of common interest and harmonize certain policies, such as
conflict prevention and defense as well as some cultural and educational exchanges.
Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, Mar. 12, 1993, J.O., May 18, 1994, arts. 7, 13(1)(2).
167. See International Agreements: European Parliament Endorses Accords with
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, supra note 166, at 534; International
Agreements: EU Signs Accords with Three Former Soviet Countries, supra note 51, at
692; see also Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the European
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of
the other part, 1999 O.J. (L 239) 42, arts. 1, 47, 50, 52 [hereinafter Partnership and
Cooperation Between the E.C. and Armenia]. With respect to the energy sector, the
agreement seeks to modernize the infrastructure and alternative energy resources,
especially important for the European Union, which is increasingly dependent on external
energy sources. See id. art. 54(1)(2); International Agreements: European Parliament
Endorses Accords with Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, supra note 166, at 534.
168. See International Agreements: European Parliament Endorses Accords with
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its laws to conform to those of the European Union, especially in
the areas of customs law, banking law, intellectual property, and
financial services.
169
The E.U. Treaty is also designed to aid Armenia in becoming
a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).17 ° In
addition, the Treaty grants MFN status for the trading of goods.
171
Nevertheless, MFN treatment does not prevent the parties from
adopting measures prohibiting, inter alia, double taxation.
172
Neither party may offer MFN treatment to the others' financial
services other than what is outlined in the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), particularly in Articles 2-5.73
Furthermore, the Treaty addresses corruption by providing
that the European Union must assist Armenia in monitoring
corrupt business and trade practices. For example, the Treaty
calls for the establishment of research centers to disseminate trade
information 174
This Treaty signifies a turning pointing in Armenia's position
in global trade and investment. It demonstrates the European
Union's confidence in Armenia's political and economic reforms.
Most notably, the European Union is Armenia's leading trading
partner, accounting for approximately one-third of Armenia's
external trade.175  In the words of Hans van de Broek, the
commissioner who oversees E.U. relations with eastern and
central European nations:
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, supra note 166, at 534.
169. Partnership and Cooperation Between the E.C. and Armenia, supra note 167, art.
43(1)(2); International Agreements: E.U. Signs Accords with Three Former Soviet
Countries, supra note 51, at 692. Armenia, along with Azerbaijan, has been admitted into
the Council of Europe, the European Union's network of European and non-European
heads of state, which addresses issues of foreign policy at regularly-held summit meetings,
furthering deeper cooperation with its European trading partners. See THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 21 (Juliet Lodge ed., 2d ed. 1993);
see also Armen Zakarian & Emil Danielian, Council of Europe Admits Armenia &
Azerbaijan, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (ARM. REP.), Nov. 8, 2000,
http://www.rferl.org/bd/ar/reports/archives/2000/11/081100.html.
170. International Agreements: E.U. Signs Accords with Three Former Soviet
Countries, supra note 51, at 692.
171. Id.
172. Partnership and Cooperation Between the E.C. and Armenia, supra note 167, arts.
9, 39.
173. Id. arts 2-5.
174. Id. art. 69.
175. Danielyan, supra note 21.
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Political stability has allowed the implementation of economic
reforms. Now we feel we have taken significant steps to ensure
the respect for the rule of law, human rights, and the principles
of a market economy. The further development of these are
essential in the relationship between the E.U. and
[Armenia] .176
IV. CONCLUSION
Armenia is one of the leading countries in the CIS because of
its reformation of laws, allowing privatization and foreign direct
investment. It has become more politically and economically
stable, thereby permitting extensiveprivatization, numerous joint
ventures, and investment treaties. 17 - This stability demonstrates
Armenia's commitment to a market-based economy and its
willingness to standardize its goods and services in conformity
with international norms. Alain Duran, Vice-President of the
Association of France Norms (AFNOR), declared that "Armenia
is one of the leading countries in the CIS by bringing the
standardization of goods and services up to international
norms." 178 A survey conducted jointly by the Armenian Ministry
of Trade and Industry and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) found that most of the sixty randomly
interviewed foreign investors regard "Armenia as an important
production base to reach markets of the former Soviet Union and
Middle East."179  Foreign investors also listed Armenia's
inexpensive, highly-skilled labor force and reliable local trade
partners as advantages to investment.
180
By implementing broad economic reforms, Armenia is better
prepared to engage in regional cooperation. For example, the
"Synergy Program" coalesces 170 organizations from Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia to pursue cross-border projects such as
176. International Agreements: E.U. Signs Accords with Three Former Soviet
Countries, supra note 51, at 692.
177. See supra Part III.
178. Armenia Shows Lead in Standardization in CIS, NoYAN TAPAN NEWS AGENCY,
Oct. 19, 1998 (on file with author).
179. Atom Markarian, Foreign Investors See Opportunities in Armenia Despite
Chronic Problems, NOYAN TAPAN NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 24, 1998 (on file with author)
[hereinafter Foreign Investors].
180. Id.
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"regional business development, tourism, regional media
cooperation, and integrated electronic communications." 181
Armenia still has many challenges to face. According to the
IMF, Armenia is a "country in transition"-it has embraced
macroeconomic ideology and implemented economic reforms to
advance its goal of becoming a market economy, yet despite its
pro-Western orientation, Armenia fails to rid itself entirely of
totalitarian influences. 182  Armenia historically identifies its
interests with Russia; Russia perceives itself as Armenia's
guardian against its Muslim neighbors. 183  This relationship
strengthened in the years following the collapse of the Soviet
Union. 184 Armenia depends heavily upon Russian economic and
military support.185 Armenia also supports Russia "on issues
concerning relations among the former Soviet republics."'186
Russia, however, has failed to sustain market reforms and combat
rampant corruption and bribery in its own government. 187
Therefore, Armenia's firm ties to Russia call into question its
commitment to market reform and whether it has shed its
totalitarian past.
Armenia's failure to strengthen its securities market and
enforce existing investment law, in addition to reports of bribery
and corruption, hinders foreign investment. 188  Investors are
181. 170 Organizations from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia Pursue New Avenues
of Cooperation, 32 ARMENIAN REP. INT'L, Dec. 12, 1998, at 29. The program is organized
by the Eurasia Foundation, a privately managed, U.S. non-profit grant-making
organization funded by USAID. Id. Eurasia has made numerous contributions to public
and private sector development in Armenia since 1995 (totaling $2,970,000) and has
provided 122 loans to businesses through its Small Business Loan Program (totaling
$3,430,000). Id. The EBRD is also assisting local business owners-one of the EBRD's
six approved projects for 2000 is to promote local small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) through specialized credit lines and direct capital investments utilizing suitable
intermediaries, including venture capital funds. EBRD Had Approved Six Investments in
Armenia Totally [sic] EUR 145.30 [Million], supra note 94.
182. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Armenia: National Human
Deveolopment Report 1999, ch. 1, at http://www.undp.am/archive/Nhdr/nhdr99/eng1.html
(last visited Feb. 14, 2001).
183. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER 164 (1996). The author argues that "[t]he Orthodox countries of the
former Soviet Union [(Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova)] are central to
the development of a coherent Russian bloc in Eurasian and world affairs." Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 163-68.
188. See Foreign Investors, supra note 179.
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reluctant to invest in a politically unstable country and are not
certain that they will receive financial incentives offered them.
189
Varoujan Kouzoukian, head of Foreign Investors Assembly, a
consulting firm based in Yerevan, laments that many economic
laws differ in practice from how they appear on paper.
190
Kouzoukian adds that frequent tax inspections of firms contribute
to the reluctance of investors to expand their involvement in
Armenia.
191
In addition, the political unrest caused by the recent
assassinations of the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the
National Assembly, as well as the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh
dispute, caused a major decline in foreign direct investment.
192
Foreign investment in Armenia, however, has increased steadily
with $107 million invested in the first half of 2000, a 122% increase
compared to the same period in 1999; an additional $400 million is
expected to be invested in 2001.193 The realization of foreign
investment projections for 2001 are inextricably linked to the
political stability and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
dispute 194
Armenia faces significant economic and social challenges,
notwithstanding macroeconomic reforms.195 Unemployment has
increased steadily since 1992, while government subsidies have
decreased.196 About 80% of the population is classified as poor or
very poor. 97 The social reforms following the 1991 coup (i.e., free
education, public health care, the right to paid work, and leisure
achievements) are no longer inexistence.198 Further, despite the
189. See id.; Atom Markarian, Obstacles to Foreign Investment in Armenia, RADIO
FREE EUR.JRADIO LIBERTY (CAUCASUS REP., vol. 1, No. 33), Oct. 16, 1998,
http://www.rferl.orglcaucasus-report/1998/10/33-161098.htm [hereinafter Obstacles].
190. Obstacles, supra note 189.
191. Id.
192. See supra Part H.A.
193. Volume of Foreign Investments into Economy of Armenia May Amount to $400
Million, SNARK Bus. BULL, Oct. 10, 2000 (on file with author).
194. See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), supra note 182, ch. 1.4,
http://www.undp.amlarchivefNhdr/nhdr99/eng/1-4.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2001).
195. United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), Country Profles-
Armenia, at http://www.unhcr.ch/worldleuro/armenia.htm (Sept. 1999).
196. See id.
197. United Nations igh Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), Country Profiles-
Armenia, supra note 195.
198. See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), supra note 182, ch. 2,
http://www.undp.am/archive/Nhdr/nhdr99/eng/2.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2001).
[Vol. 23:427454
2001] Armenia: Privatization and Foreign Investment
formal involvement of the population in the privatization process,
only 10% of the population retained and accumulated
privatization certificates and exercised their rights to
privatization. 199 The remainder sold the certificates on the black
market at extremely low prices, remaining alienated from
property.
20 0
Foreign investment in Armenia will sustain its transition from
a central to market economy. The government reforms previously
enacted must be enforced and new ones must be created. The
transition to democracy and a market economy will take time. As
Armen Yeghiazarian, former Minister of the Economy, noted:
"Armenia is a country which is trying to become democratic, and
that's not something you can do in four years." 20 1  A firm
commitment to adhere to market principles and active
engagement in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute are
essential to restore investor confidence in ArmeniaLu 2  Any
wavering in such commitment jeopardizes all privatizations as well
as prospects for continued foreign investment.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Freeland, supra note 18, at 35.
202. See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), supra note 182, ch. 1.4,
http://www.undp.amlarchive/Nhdr/nhdr99/eng1-4.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2001).
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